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A SYMPOSIUM ON SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
 This symposium was the brainchild of Daniel Oquendo, a 2018 graduate of New 
York Law School.1 Daniel was motivated to attend law school to help families avoid 
the tragedy his family faced in 2014 when his brother Avonte, a New York City special 
needs student, drowned in a nearby river after he left school through an unattended 
exit without anyone in authority noticing. Daniel thought a symposium would allow 
him to honor his brother and be a fitting capstone to his legal education.
 He proposed the idea to me in 2017 when he was a student in my special 
education law class. I enthusiastically agreed; not only was I happy to participate in 
Daniel’s memorial to his brother and his law school capstone, but a symposium in 
2018 would be perfectly timed to address two highly anticipated United States 
Supreme Court decisions in special education law.
 Our expectations were met. In the course of one month in 2017, the Court issued 
its decisions, first in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools,2 and next in Endrew F. v. 
Douglas County School District RE-1.3 Both were landmark decisions and offered much 
to discuss and analyze: The first two panels of the symposium were dedicated to their 
impact, followed by a third panel that considered systemic challenges and proposed 
reforms to providing special education to students with disabilities in New York City.4 
In addition to these panels, Amy Rowley and her father, Clifford, whose case on 
behalf of Amy went to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1982,5 spoke to symposium 
attendees.
 The articles in this Issue of the New York Law School Law Review document 
society’s failure to meet the educational needs of children with disabilities by 
establishing a low standard of the “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) that 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires;6 the failure of 
school districts to provide adequate training to students with autism; the limited 
judicial redress available to children with disabilities who allege that their schools 
have discriminated against them; delays in providing special education standards; 
and the failure of school districts and family courts to coordinate so that students in 
juvenile delinquency proceedings receive needed educational services to address their 
behavioral issues.
1. Daniel Oquendo was a Legal Scholarship Editor of the 2017–2018 New York Law School Law Review. 
He received his J.D. from New York Law School in 2018 and is an associate at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & 
Hamilton LLP. See his article in this Issue: Daniel Oquendo, Failing the Most Vulnerable Among Us: The 
Lack of Redress for Children with Disabilities, 63 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 61 (2018–2019). 
2. 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017). 
3. 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
4. For the Continuing Legal Education materials from the symposium, see From Rowley to Endrew F.: The 
Meaning of a FAPE, N.Y.L. Sch. (Mar. 23, 2018), http://www.nyls.edu/impact-center-for-public-
interest-law/wp-content/uploads/sites/140/2018/03/CLE-Materials-Panel-1-Revised-1.pdf.
5. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). Amy June Rowley, who is deaf, was an elementary 
school student in Peekskill, New York when the U.S. Supreme Court decided that federal law did not 
require her school to provide her with a sign-language interpreter. Id.
6. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2017).
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 But the articles also offer hope for the future of special education. They argue 
that Endrew F. raises the standard for providing a FAPE to children with disabilities;7 
propose changes to evidentiary rules and procedures for providing special education;8 
and explore other methods of meeting the educational needs of children with 
disabilities.9 Amy Rowley exhorted members of the audience to work to implement 
these and other reforms:
It’s up to people [like you] to advocate for special education, to raise the bar 
and hold it strong and high for all deaf children, for children with all 
disabilities, so all of them can reach their potential. If we don’t continue to 
fight for these students, who will?10
 The brief introduction that follows does not capture the full depth and breadth 
of the articles but tries to identify their common themes and whet the reader’s 
appetite for more. This introduction is arranged by panel: The articles under Panel 
One review the evolution of the FAPE standard; the articles under Panel Two 
address access to the courts to vindicate rights under the anti-discrimination laws; 
and the Panel Three articles identify systemic problems and solutions in the provision 
of special education.
I. PANEL ONE: FROM ROWLEY TO ENDREW F.: THE MEANING OF A FAPE
 Amy Rowley’s moving account of her family’s heroic efforts to obtain a service 
that was necessary to provide her a basic education offers insight into the impact that 
the judiciary’s failure had on her personally. But Amy, Gary Mayerson,11 and I agree 
that Endrew F. offers new hope that the standard for educating children with 
disabilities will be raised to the level that the Rowleys envisioned when they read 
about a new law that would enable Amy to attend their local public school, and sent 
her to school assuming their request for a sign-language interpreter for Amy would 
be fulfilled. 
 One compelling lesson to learn from the Rowleys is that the legal system often 
has a blind spot for the human aspect of the cases that come before it, which only 
expands as cases climb the appellate ladder, resulting in decisions based on cold and 
7. See Richard D. Marsico, From Rowley to Endrew F.: The Evolution of a Free Appropriate Education for 
Children with Disabilities, 63 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 29 (2018–2019); Gary S. Mayerson, Generalization 
After Endrew F.: Shrinking the Gap Between Access and Outcome for Students Diagnosed with Autism, 63 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 51 (2018–2019).
8. See Oquendo, supra note 1.
9. See id.; Lisa F. Grumet, Court-to-School Pipelines: Meeting Special Education Needs for Students on Juvenile 
Probation in New York, 63 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 73 (2018–2019); Samantha C. Pownall, Education 
Delayed Is Education Denied, 63 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 95 (2018–2019).
10. Address by Amy June Rowley, Ph.D., Professor, California State University, East Bay, 63 N.Y.L. Sch. L. 
Rev. 21, 27 (2018–2019).
11. Gary Mayerson is a 1979 graduate of the Georgetown University Law Center and is the founder of 
Mayerson & Associates, the first law firm in the nation dedicated to the representation of individuals 
with autism.
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old records bereft of life. Many of the key facts that Amy related about her story did 
not make their way into the Supreme Court’s decision. These include her school’s 
haphazard experiment with an interpreter that was doomed to fail; how her mom—a 
teacher herself—had to teach Amy every afternoon what she had missed in school 
that day, denying her the chance to play and have fun with the other kids; and how 
the interpreter she finally received in third grade not only helped Amy academically, 
but allowed Amy access to all aspects of her school life, including relating to the 
other children.12
 When the Supreme Court issued Rowley, ruling that Amy’s school was not 
required to provide her with an interpreter, it was a blow to Amy and her family:
[The Supreme Court] felt that, based on my ability to pass the classes that I 
had previously, that I was doing okay. I was passing my classes, and they 
considered that a success. That was a terrible outcome for me and my parents, 
who worked so hard.13
Amy faced many other obstacles in school after this decision, including a physically 
abusive teacher and an inability to understand what was happening in class, but she 
persevered, and now has a doctorate and is a professor at California State University, 
East Bay. But not all stories like Amy’s have happy endings. At least moving forward, 
Endrew F. offers hope.
 In my article in this Issue, I document the path the Supreme Court and circuit 
courts have followed in establishing the standard for educating children with 
disabilities.14 In Rowley, the Court rejected the Rowleys’ claim that the IDEA 
requires school districts to provide an equal educational opportunity to students with 
disabilities. Instead, the Court established a standard that required school districts 
only to provide access to education that is “meaningful.”15 Applying this standard to 
Amy, the Court ruled that because she was passing her courses and moving from 
grade to grade, the district was providing her with an educational benefit. Following 
Rowley, the circuit courts applied their own spin, many of them defining an 
educational benefit to require less than what Rowley required. Endrew F. rejected the 
lowest of these standards—the “merely more than de minimis” test.16 In doing so, it 
reformulated the FAPE standard. Now, school districts must provide students with 
disabilities an education that is “appropriately ambitious” in light of their individual 
circumstances.17 This holding raises the FAPE standard, hewing far closer to what 
the Rowleys proposed and the Court rejected.
12. See Rowley Address, supra note 10, at 23–24.
13. Id. at 24–25.
14. See Marsico, supra note 7.
15. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982).
16. 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001 (2017).
17. See id. at 992.
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 Gary Mayerson’s article in this Issue demonstrates one way that Endrew F. offers 
hope to children with autism.18 Mayerson explains how the pre-Endrew F. “de 
minimis” standard failed children with autism who require specialized instruction to 
learn the skill of generalization—the ability to apply skills and behaviors learned 
from one setting to another. Autism clinicians agree that teaching generalization to 
students with autism is essential, yet virtually all pre-Endrew F. federal court 
decisions rejected the claim that the IDEA requires it. Citing language from Endrew 
F. and its “more robust” standard, Mayerson makes a strong argument that this new 
standard requires school districts to teach generalization skills to students with 
autism who need it.19
II. PANEL TWO: ENDREW F. AND FRY
 Federal law—including the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504)—prohibits discrimination against 
children with disabilities and provides monetary damages for violations.20 Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972 also applies when a student with a disability 
reports sexual misconduct at school.21 These laws are meaningless unless children 
and their parents are able to enforce them.
 Daniel Oquendo’s article addresses an obstacle that the Federal Rules of Evidence 
pose for children with disabilities in obtaining redress for sexual and other forms of 
abuse suffered in school.22 The article focuses on Doe v. Darien Board of Education, in 
which the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut ruled that the 
hearsay statements of a twelve-year-old boy with Down syndrome were inadmissible 
as proof that he notified the school principal and psychologist about his abuse.23 
Because of his disability, Doe was unable to testify, and because the key evidence 
that school officials were aware of the abuse were his inadmissible hearsay statements, 
the court barred the evidence at trial and the school board and the district were 
ultimately found not liable.24 Oquendo proposes 1) that the Federal Rules of Evidence 
be revised to include a new hearsay exception for children with disabilities who have 
a documented communication difficulty; 2) that the courts interpret the excited 
18. See Mayerson, supra note 7.
19. See id.
20. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2017); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2017).
21. Title IX provides in pertinent part that “no person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); see also U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence 6 (2014), https://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf.
22. See Oquendo, supra note 1.
23. See 110 F. Supp. 3d 386 (D. Conn. 2015).
24. See id. at 403; Martin B. Cassidy, Former Darien School Aide Found Guilty of Sex Abuse, NewsTimes 
(Aug. 13, 2015, 6:55 AM), http://www.newstimes.com/news/article/Former-Darien-school-aide-
found-guilty-of-sex-6441870.php.
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utterance and residual hearsay exceptions more broadly in cases involving children 
with disabilities; and 3) that Congress fully fund the IDEA to ensure adequate 
resources are available to provide school officials with better training to detect and 
aid in the prevention of sexual abuse of children with disabilities at school.
 The IDEA creates another obstacle for children with disabilities who seek 
monetary damages for violations of the ADA and Section 504: They must exhaust 
their IDEA administrative remedies prior to filing a lawsuit if the complaint is 
“seeking relief that is also available” under the IDEA.25 But unlike the ADA and 
Section 504, monetary damages are generally not available for IDEA violations.26 
The conclusion of this syllogism should be that when parents file a lawsuit pursuant 
to the ADA or Section 504 seeking monetary damages for disability discrimination 
against their child, the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement does not apply. This is not, 
however, how the lower courts have ruled. Instead of adopting the plain meaning of 
the exhaustion exception, courts have held that plaintiffs must first exhaust the 
IDEA’s administrative remedies if there is any relief the IDEA can provide, regardless 
of whether the plaintiffs seek that relief.27
 When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fry28—its first venture into the 
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement—it seemed that the Court might be ready to 
straighten things out. Instead, it created a two-part test for determining whether the 
exhaustion requirement applies to claims for monetary damages for disability 
discrimination—a test that is not derived from the statutory language of the exception 
and does little to clarify the confusion over when the exception applies. Consider the 
following two hypotheticals, both of which are based on real-life cases that took 
place prior to Fry:
Hypothetical One
Charlie F. suffers from attention deficit disorder and panic attacks. Charlie 
F.’s disabilities cause him to be disruptive in class. His teacher asked the class 
to publicly air their complaints against Charlie and they did, causing Charlie 
to lose confidence and self-esteem. This led to fights and the disruption of 
Charlie’s educational program. Charlie’s parents wanted to sue the school 
district for monetary damages and they consulted an attorney.29
Hypothetical Two
E.M. suffers from muscular dystrophy that limits his ability to engage in 
physical education. E.M.’s individualized education program (IEP) limited 
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2017). 
26. See, e.g., Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Although injunctive relief is 
available under the IDEA, ordinarily monetary damages are not.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also 
Deborah N. Archer & Richard D. Marsico, Special Education Law and Practice: Cases 
and Materials 644–50 (2017). 
27. Archer & Marsico, supra note 26, at 567–69.
28. 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017).
29. See Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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his participation in physical education. But E.M.’s physical education teacher 
required him to engage in more intense physical activity than permitted by 
his IEP, and as a result, he suffered kidney damage. E.M.’s parents wanted to 
sue the school district for monetary damages and they consulted an attorney.30
 The attorneys in Hypotheticals One and Two counseled their clients identically. 
First, they presented the good news: The ADA and Section 504 prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of disability, and the facts create a plausible claim for 
relief under both statutes. Then, they presented the bad news: The IDEA requires 
them to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative remedies prior to bringing a lawsuit. But 
since the IDEA does not provide for monetary damages—which is the only form of 
relief they were seeking—they may not need to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative 
remedies after all.
 However, their attorneys presented an important caveat: The courts have 
construed the exhaustion provision to require exhaustion if any relief is available 
under the IDEA, whether the families seek it or not. “What should we do?” the 
parents asked their attorneys. There was no good answer. The attorneys explained 
that since the courts were inconsistent, it was unclear whether they would be better 
off playing it safe and exhausting administrative remedies and delaying filing a 
lawsuit, or taking a chance and suing in federal court.
 In Fry, the Supreme Court attempted to answer their question. The parents in 
Fry obtained a trained service dog named Wonder for their daughter, E.F., who has 
cerebral palsy.31 Wonder helps her live independently by performing tasks like 
retrieving dropped items and helping her with the toilet, her walker, the doors, the 
lights, and her coat.32 The Frys asked E.F.’s school to allow Wonder to attend E.F.’s 
kindergarten class, but the school refused, stating that E.F.’s IEP included a one-to-
one aide to assist her during the day and the dog was thus not necessary.33 The Frys 
claimed this refusal violated the ADA and Section 504, but the lower courts 
dismissed their suit for failure to exhaust the IDEA’s procedures.34 The Supreme 
Court vacated the judgment and remanded.
 The Court ruled that in determining whether a plaintiff is “seek[ing] relief that 
is also available” under the IDEA, a court “should look to the substance, or gravamen, 
of the plaintiff ’s complaint,” which can be gleaned by a two-step inquiry.35 First, the 
court can ask two hypothetical questions; an affirmative response to both serves as a 
strong indicator that the gravamen is something other than the IDEA: 1) whether 
the plaintiff could have brought the same complaint against a public facility that is 
not a school; and 2) whether an adult at the school could have brought the same 
30. See McCormick v. Waukegan Sch. Dist. No. 60, 374 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2004).
31. 137 S. Ct. at 750–51.
32. Id. at 751.
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 751–52.
35. Id. at 752.
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claim.36 Second, a court can look to the history of the proceedings, including, for 
example, whether the plaintiff initially utilized the IDEA’s administrative 
proceedings to resolve the dispute; if the case originated as a request for an impartial 
hearing based on an IDEA violation, this is a strong indicator that the gravamen 
involves the IDEA.37 Because the lower courts did not consider these factors, the 
Court remanded the case for reconsideration.38
 We can now return to our hypotheticals, this time with Fry’s test in mind. The 
family in Hypothetical One, whose child was publicly degraded by his classmates at 
the behest of their teacher, need not exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing 
a claim in court because both of Fry ’s hypothetical questions are answered 
affirmatively: First, the same claim could be brought against a public facility that is 
not a school; and second, an adult at the school could sue for damages if humiliated 
by a school official. Thus, the parents in Hypothetical One can immediately 
commence their lawsuit and seek monetary damages.
 But the family in Hypothetical Two, whose disabled child suffered serious injury 
during gym class, would need to first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative remedies: 
They could not have brought the claim against a public facility that is not a school 
since the claim involves physical education class, and an adult at the school could not 
bring the claim because they would not be enrolled in physical education class.
 In both cases, the teacher harmed the student, the teacher was acting outside the 
child’s IEP, and the families did not seek an IDEA remedy but instead sought 
monetary damages. Yet a post-Fry analysis leads to different outcomes for both 
families: The family in Hypothetical One can bypass exhaustion and immediately 
seek redress in court, but the family in Hypothetical Two cannot. Applying Fry to 
each hypothetical yields opposite results, despite the lack of any meaningful 
distinction between the two.
 The Fry Court’s failure was looking to the gravamen of the complaint rather 
than the plain meaning of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. The statutory 
language of the requirement does not refer to the substance of the complaint; it looks 
to the relief the complaint seeks.39 A test based on the plain language of the IDEA 
would be: 1) What relief is the plaintiff seeking?; and 2) is that relief also available 
under the IDEA?
III. PANEL THREE: SYSTEMIC CHALLENGES AND REFORMS IN NEW YORK CITY
 In their articles, Professors Samantha Pownall and Lisa Grumet identify the 
consequences of mishandling the educational needs of children with disabilities.40 
36. Id. at 756–57.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 758–59.
39. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2017).
40. See Pownall, supra note 9; Grumet, supra note 9. Professor Pownall teaches the Education Law Clinic, 
Children and the Law in Practice, and Legal Practice at New York Law School. Professor Grumet is a 
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Pownall’s article reports significant delays in evaluating and providing educational 
services to children with disabilities in New York City. Her proposed reforms include 
implementing an accurate database to track each step the Department of Education 
(DOE) takes pursuant to the IDEA’s mandatory identification, evaluation, and 
placement process; more state audits of the DOE’s IDEA implementation record; 
promulgating clear and consistent policies to comply with the IDEA’s provisions 
relating to pendency, related services, and independent educational evaluations; 
resolving hearings expeditiously; and providing parents with mandatory documents, 
including prior written and procedural safeguards notices.
 Professor Grumet’s article focuses on the fate of students with disabilities in New 
York State who are arrested outside of school. Grumet points out that these students 
often do not receive the educational services they need to address their behavioral 
issues because of the lack of coordination between family courts and schools. Schools 
are not parties to juvenile delinquency proceedings, family court does not have 
authority to order school districts to provide particular educational services to 
students, and school districts may not even receive notice when a student is engaged 
in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Grumet identifies several approaches to 
improve the coordination between family court and schools and recommends the 
creation of an education advocate for students with disabilities who are engaged with 
the juvenile justice system. Such an advocate would work with students to make sure 
that they are properly evaluated by their school district and receive appropriate 
educational services.
IV. CONCLUSION
 The articles in this symposium Issue of the New York Law School Law Review are 
much richer than the outline I offer in this Introduction; I encourage you to read 
them.
Visiting Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Diane Abbey Law Institute for Children and 
Families at New York Law School.
